Corrupção e a dinâmica do resultado primário dos municípios brasileiros

Abstract

This article aims to verify to what extent political corruption can compromise the efforts of public entities to reach pre-established goals for the primary result. Thus, verify the existence of a structural change in the primary result of Brazilian municipalities during the period in which the case of the “mafia of ambulances” or “leeches” occurred (1999 to 2006). Our results initially estimated through a purely seasonal model of moving averages of the primary result indicated, through the Chow test, that there were consecutive structural changes in the series during the period of the corruption scandal, with 2004 being the year that presented breaks more significant structural. Under the aegis of the theory of rational choice, we can conclude that corruption is a type of action that characterizes the rationality of social actors tend to select actions whose expected result is a look totally under the primacy of the individual over the collective, above all, maximizing it if earnings. In this case, businessmen and politicians negotiated bidding contracts for the acquisition of vehicles and equipment for the health area, whose estimated amounts exceed one hundred million reais.